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Abstract: Rhetoric from both domestic and international policy actors equated
foreign direct investment and robust business growth in Sierra Leone with an
exit from fragility. To the contrary, the trajectory of private sector development
experienced from 2002 to 2014 contributed to Sierra Leone’s socio-political chal-
lenges, replicating in the contemporary period dynamics of grievance and exclu-
sion that were root causes of the country’s endemic instability and then civil war.
This study challenges the practices and refines the ideas underlying the prevailing
vision for business-led development in Sierra Leone and other fragile states. It links
extensive documentation of the role of business in Sierra Leone with peacebuild-
ing and statebuilding frameworks to present a novel perspective on the mecha-
nisms of action of private sector development in contexts of persistent fragility.
In doing so, it provides a foundation on which further theoretical propositions
for the ordering of business-state relations in support of transitions from fragility
to peaceful development can be developed and tested.
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Introduction
Emerging from the civil war that ended in 2002, private sector development was an
explicit strategy to reduce fragility and accelerate human development in Sierra
Leone. The government, for example, touted “mining for peace”; the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) argued that reforms
enacted to attract foreign investors helped make “progress towards achieving
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peace and stability”; and the African Development Bank claimed to “spread the
peace dividend” by “supporting private sector development and business enabling
environment.”
Some successes may be claimed. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
announced at the end of 2016 that “The government’s economic reform
program supported by the Extended Credit Facility has achieved its key objectives
despite the exogenous shocks of the Ebola epidemic and the collapse of iron ore
prices”; it implied that the country was on the path to “stronger andmore inclusive
growth.”1Much wasmade of the pre-Ebola boom in the extractives sector in which
the country marked 22–25 percent GDP growth, making Sierra Leone the fastest
growing economy in the world.
Yet Sierra Leone remained in a profoundly fragile state. After the end of the
armed conflict enabled an initial improvement in most indicators, the country
again experienced rises in prices of basic consumer goods, deterioration in student
performance in public exams, and below-average indicators of health, housing, and
access to electricity compared to the rest of the continent. The Auditor General
more or less continuously questioned the public accounts; the Ibrahim Index of
African Governance “accountability” measure of 33/100 showed “warning signs” of
deterioration, including a 23/100 score for “diversion of public funds.”
The Ebola epidemic in 2014 put into stark relief the lack of progress in state legit-
imacy and institutional capacity from the period leading up to the war. The health
system failed; decentralized services, internal communications, and border controls
evidenced critical weaknesses; and the population demonstrated their distrust in
officials with sometimes violent opposition to government responses.2 Only consid-
erable foreign financial and technical aid prevented state collapse.
Private-sector led economic growth from 2002 to 2014 did little to break Sierra
Leone’s cycle of fragility. Indeed,
political, economic and social conditions prevalent in the country show increasing similarities
with the past, including widespread under-employment, a sluggish economy, high depen-
dence on the extractives for foreign exchange, rapid fall of the local currency’s value
against major currencies, and increasing public pressure for accountability.3
Additionally, business investment and operations became implicated in other
dynamics of the country’s persistent fragility, through the perversion of interna-
tional private sector promotion efforts, the state’s implication in citizen insecurity,
growing frustration of civil society, and the reinforcement of regional and ethnic
tensions. Contrary to the rhetoric of peace dividends and stability, the private
1 IMF (2016).
2 Wilkinson and Fairhead (2017).
3 Wennmann, Ganson, and Luiz (2017).
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sector remained one of the vectors for persistent poverty, increasing inequality,
and growing instability.
Despite such realities, international policy and practice increasingly premise
exits from fragility on robust private sector development. This was exemplified by
the creation by the International Development Association (IDA)—the World
Bank’s fund for the world’s 75 poorest countries—of a U.S. $2.5 billion “Private
Sector Window,” implemented in conjunction with the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
“to catalyze private sector investment … with a focus on fragile and conflict-
affected states” such as Sierra Leone. It is premised on “the need to help mitigate
the uncertainties and risks, real or perceived, to high impact private sector invest-
ment” that enables “growth, resilience and opportunity.”4
Such policies are premised on a benign view of the private sector potential in
fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) prevalent in the literature. Collier and
others have found that the risk of reversion to conflict rises inversely to income;
similarly, a reversion to violence becomes more likely the slower the economic
recovery.5 Private sector development initiatives, therefore, intend to change indi-
vidual firm behavior in ways that accelerate economic growth, increasing employ-
ment and reducing poverty.6 Under this line of reasoning, the mere presence and
operation of ethical businesses is peace and development positive—identified as a
preeminent thrust of the business and peace literature.7
Without any apparent irony, the World Bank chose Freetown, in May 2017, as
one stage to promote its new Private Sector Window. Yet cases like Sierra Leone, in
which private sector development is strongly implicated in endemic fragility, stand
as a warning to the limitations of such theory as translated into practice. This is
consistent with qualitative analysis from any number of fragile states that show
that business operations can contribute to prolongation or exacerbation of conflict,8
notwithstanding explicit ambitions to bring a “development dividend” to local pop-
ulations.9 Business resources can intensify competition between groups,10 meaning
that private sector promotion may as easily undermine peaceful development as
support it.11 The Sierra Leone case, thus, calls into question the ideas, institutions,
4 IDA (2017).
5 Manuel (2015).
6 White and Fortune (2015).
7 Kolk and Lenfant (2015); Oetzel, Westermann-Behaylo, Koerber, Fort, and Rivera (2010).
8 E.g., Afghanistan: DuPée (2012); Nigeria: Idemudia (2010); Colombia: Dunning and Wirpsa
(2004).
9 Miklian, Schouten, and Ganson (2016).
10 Zandvliet and Anderson (2009).
11 Ganson and Wennmann (2016).
604 Brian Ganson and Herbert M’cleod
and practices underlying the role of private sector development (PSD) in global
development and transitions from fragility to peaceful and inclusive development.
As international initiatives to address fragility through PSD accelerate, this gap
between policy intention and impact remains of critical importance for both Sierra
Leone and other fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS). In the period since 2000,
the average growth per capita for FCAS of 1.19 percent per annum remains below
that of low- and middle-income countries (LICs) as a whole; their level of volatility
is more than three times as high as that of the world average for LICs.12 About two-
thirds of FCAS did not achieve the Millennium Development Goal of cutting
poverty by half.13 FCAS economic and social vulnerability therefore remain
pronounced.
If the emerging forms of state-business relations represented by ever greater
private sector promotion are to play a meaningful role in transitions from fragility
to peaceful development in Sierra Leone and other FCAS, it is, therefore, impera-
tive to better understand shortfalls of policy interventions and programmatic
implementation related to PSD in such contexts. From a theoretical standpoint,
it will be useful to better describe and model the ways in which PSD becomes
entangled with socio-political conflict and other dynamics of fragility, so that the
trajectories of PSD in Sierra Leone and other FCAS can be better assessed, com-
pared, and understood. This is the intent of this study.
Methodology
The study draws on four data sources to inform its analysis. It began with a com-
prehensive literature review to plot the trajectory of private sector development
from Sierra Leone’s founding through the civil war. Desk research illuminated
developments in the contemporary period, with a focus on the end of the civil
war in 2002 through the Ebola crisis of 2014.
This research was deepened with semi-structured interviews. These included
local government officials, community advocates, and private sector actors with
direct experience of the impacts of private sector development on conflict and fra-
gility in their communities, as well as country experts, policymakers, and research-
ers at the country level. Interviewswere anonymous following standard practice on
conflict sensitive research.
Perspectives from earlier interviews were summarized and related forward to
subsequent interviewees for their reflection. This process allowed different
12 Calculated using World Bank 2017 data. World Bank (2018).
13 OECD (2015).
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perspectives to be brought into contact through an open and emergent process,14
largely mimicking the criteria for a focus group.15 Insights from such a process
cannot be taken at face value. But they should have a high level of content
validity—that is, capture the problem framing and perceived levers for action—
from the perspective of an expert and experienced cohort.16
As the exercise involved both theory generation and provisional testing of
theory, a constant comparative method of analysis was used,17 based on interview
notes. Additionally, a working paper captured preliminary insights from the back-
ground research and interview series. Preliminary findings were analyzed and
further insights were developed through a consultation session in Freetown that
brought together expert academics, economic actors, civil society representatives,
and government officials with direct and substantial experience in Sierra Leone.
The consultation was conducted under the Chatham House rule.
The study links insights so derived with peacebuilding and statebuilding
frameworks to present a model with empirical and theoretical referents for the
negative interactions of private sector investment with key factors of fragility. In
doing so, it builds toward a more robust explanatory typology.18 Here, applied to
the policy arena, such typologies have proven important to management research,
as they allow research to “represent organizational forms that might exist rather
than existing organizations” and to explore combinations of multiple organiza-
tional dimensions to arrive at ideal types.19 Given the lack of extent theory and
models in this domain, this allows the meeting of theory and practice in the devel-
opment of a parsimonious framework to help describe complex systems and better
explain outcomes.20
For the practice and policy communities, the strength of such modelling may
be, as with soft systems approaches, “its ability to bring to the surface different per-
ceptions of the problem and structure these in a way that all involved find fruit-
ful.”21 For the researcher, it presents a novel perspective on the mechanisms of
action of the private sector on fragility so that further theoretical propositions
can be developed and tested.





19 Doty and Glick (1994), 233.
20 Ibid., 230.
21 Chapman (2004), 76.
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The political economy of fragility
By war’s end, the horrific and predatory nature of Sierra Leone’s private sector had
become undeniable. The war in Sierra Leone was described as “a struggle between
two rival groups supported by businessmen intent on gaining control of mineral
wealth.”22 On the one side, De Beers and Lazare Kaplan International bought
cheap diamonds from Charles Taylor in Liberia; on the other, security interests
and economic ones were closely linked under agreements with President
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.23 This was “a violent conflict among multinational corpo-
rations in which one company wouldwin handsomely, but the country itself would
lose.”24
The peace process that ended the armed conflict treated these dynamics as
aberrations of war. Only two articles in the Lomé peace agreement signed in
1999 looked beyond the cessation of hostilities to a new socio-political order:
Article VII addressed strategic minerals, gold, and diamonds; Article XXVIII, in
two paragraphs, spoke to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the economy.
The framework was one of a “return to normalcy” by “rebuilding” the country.
Yet the outbreak of the civil war had simply served to accelerate dynamics
already inmotion. “The state” in fact had been a veneer hiding the absence of legit-
imate or effective government,25 unable to stop the spread of conflict to the whole
of the territory.26 Citizens, as well as state and private assets, were left utterly
unprotected.27
Indeed, analyses of the events of the civil war28 and the peace process29 under-
line the degree to which the war represented continuity rather than discontinuity:
first, from the roots of fragility into the nature of the war, and second, in the devel-
opments during and after the war that laid the groundwork for the dynamics of fra-
gility in contemporary Sierra Leone. Failure to take deliberate measures to “forge a
new relationship between the new Sierra Leone and its citizens” from indepen-
dence to the present “pre-empted the development of a legitimate state with a
social contract that bound rulers to the citizenry.”30
22 Perez (2000).
23 Ibid., 36.
24 Ganson and Wennmann (2016), 44.
25 Abdullah (2004); Richards (2003).
26 TRC (2004).
27 Ibid.; Clapham (2003).
28 Ballentine and Nitzschke (2006); Davies (2002); Richards (2003); TRC (2004); Vorrath (2014).
29 Abdullah (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2016); Assangna (2017); Fayemi (2004); Meyer (2007).
30 M’cleod and Ganson (2018).
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Continuity was, therefore, the defining feature in the private sector as well. As
explored below, from Sierra’s independence to the contemporary period, the
private sector remained centrally implicated in poverty, increasing inequality,
and growing instability.
The economy for the few
Voluminous studies,31 including the comprehensive report of the Sierra Leone
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),32 document how continuity in the
extractive economy from the colonial into the post-colonial period maintained a
private sector that would increase rather than decrease fragility. High government
officials entered into “public-private partnerships” to plunder state assets. As just
one example, President Stevens enabled smuggling bymaking a business associate
a shareholder in the national diamond company, leading to a drop in diamond
exports reported in government accounts from above 500,000 carats in 1980 to
below 50,000 carats in 1988.33 As a result of such dynamics, honest indigenous
businesses were crowded out, and the only foreign operators were those with
high risk appetites, predominantly in the minerals sector.
Against this background, the post-war period similarly experienced obvious
and growing income inequalities generated by minerals-led growth. The mineral
sector (iron ore, rutile, bauxite, and non-ASM diamonds) was highly capital inten-
sive and returned rents to a disproportionate few, including state officials manag-
ing the sector. Muchwasmade of the boom in the extractives sector, which pushed
year-on-year GDP growth as high as 25 percent and gave the country the fastest
growing economy in theworld. In fact, this could be attributed largely to the invest-
ment and operations of two iron ore mines.
These mines collapsed in the Ebola epidemic, along with ADDAX, the large
sugar plantation. It was established that these companies had wasted productive
resources on benefits ranging from private plane travel and free fuel to excessive
salaries for politically-connected members of the country’s elite, leaving the enter-
prises no operational buffer when international prices fell.34 Many local compa-
nies, as well as local subsidiaries of foreign companies, that were tied to these
industries also failed. During the same period, international businesses engaged
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in wholesale corruption. This often took the form of contracts at inflated prices that
allowed those in power to capture illicit rents.35
Additionally, the land- and resource-hungry enterprises that tend to be pro-
moted by those most focused on personal enrichment, for example, in mining
or commercial agriculture, brought them into direct conflict with farming and pas-
toral communities whose livelihoods were disrupted. Conflict over practices
related to large-scale investments in Sierra Leone—from land allocation to lack
of prioritization of local employment to deployment of military and paramilitary
forces to suppress protest—increasingly evidenced grievances and fault lines
that echo the run-up to the civil war.
Policy incoherence and manipulation
In the pre-war period, and, in particular, in the 1980s, the World Bank and IMF
insisted on the typical packages of structural reforms. But since the government
had no real intent to see agreed upon reforms through, indigenous businesses
saw few benefits, and they failed to grow, add jobs, or otherwise demonstrate
benefit to the population at large. Monetary policies that restricted credit and
foreign exchange, along with increased taxes, put honest private sector actors
under continuous stress, while access to goods and services that the government
had promised to citizens never materialized. Such incoherent policy implementa-
tion, driven by deeply-rooted patronage politics and corruption,36 underlay the
inequality and inter-group resentment that rendered Sierra Leone more prone
to external shocks as well as to internal friction.
In the post-war period, incoherent and sometimes even contradictory policies
similarly limited the expansion and productivity of those formal businesses that
had been established.37 Foreign investors and those who promote them became
a key constituency of the government, engendering a dynamic similar to that of
the pre-war era. The government accommodated (or attempted to hoodwink)
the IMF and World Bank, and did what it needed to in order to attract FDI. It
rarely balanced and, more rarely still, prioritized the needs and interests of the
informal sector and the real domestic economy. As one example, FEWS NET
(the Famine Early Warning Systems Network) in 2015 rated Sierra Leone as in
crisis (Phase 3), with the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the
United Nations reporting that 45 percent of the population did not have sufficient
access to food during some period of the year. Yet the government’s attention
35 E.g., as identified by the Special Audit of the Auditor General report of 2016 on the Military.
36 Kpundeh (1994).
37 Wennmann, Ganson, and Luiz (2017).
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remained focused on international initiatives, such as the New Alliance for Food
Security, that are widely criticized by experts (including the UN Special
Representative on the Right to Food) for their prioritization of export agriculture
into global value chains over local food security.
Such policy initiatives—despite any intended developmental impact—are,
therefore, best understood as important catalysts for FDI that became a renewed
source of plunder by government officials at elite and lower levels alike.
Additionally, the government hid behind international mandates to pursue its par-
tisan political interests. When the IMF, as part of its structural reform package,
required the government to reduce its workforce, for example, it targeted per-
ceived opposition members and those from opposition-controlled areas of the
country; privatization carried out under IMF andWorld Bank supervision similarly
benefited government supporters.38 These actions bred “national divide and ani-
mosity, particularly on the part of those regions of Sierra Leone that may feel left
out of national development.”39
The state’s implication in citizen insecurity
As the economy declined in the pre-war period, the executive became increasingly
intolerant of dissent and dictatorial.40 It controlled all other organs of government,
including a police force and a judiciary that were seen to be complicit in politically
motivated prosecutions.41 These developments contributed to the state’s ineffi-
ciency and ineffectiveness in delivering public goods and services.42 They also
led to what has been characterized as a state of institutionalized violence and
corruption.43
These failures in the rule of law found disturbing equivalents in the post-war
period. Media pointed to the arrest and detention of political opponents; civil
society noted that the recommendations of Commissions of enquiry set up to
investigate government excesses or malpractices were largely ignored. The
Human Rights Commission and others documented the use of excessive force
on protesting civilians, harassment of opposition politicians, and denial of rights
and abuse of discretionary power by the justice system.44
38 Mustapha (2010).
39 Ibid., 154.
40 Robinson (2008); Ogunmola (2009); TRC (2004).
41 Freedom House (2009).
42 Bah (2011); Maponga and Abdullah (2012).
43 Zack-Williams (1999).
44 See, e.g., Amnesty International (2018).
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Such dynamics played out more specifically in the economic realm, with the
legal system and security structures manipulated to support the economic inter-
ests of ruling elites. In one case, the high court ruled against a host community,
finding that a particular mining company was exempt from the payment of all
taxes according to the terms of the mining agreement between the state and the
company—although this outcome violated legitimate local expectations, espoused
national policy, and international norms and standards. Around Bo Town, in the
southern region, government representatives from the opposition party held little
sway in national decision-making. There, NGOs report that complaints of abuses
against foreign companies engaged in road construction went unheeded, and that
the army had been deployed on behalf of government-aligned companies to
secure “voluntary” agreements from local communities for resettlement and
related compensation. Informants described a potential “powder keg”45 where
militant structures were being reactivated in response to perceived injustices.
Reinforcement of regional and ethnic tensions
At independence, the British Crown Colony and the Protectorate merged uneasily
and incompletely to create Sierra Leone. Colonial mindsets and structures contin-
ued under new masters to constitute the formal state.46 But these relied on infor-
mal state structures based on traditional governance models to ensure local
support for actors on the national stage.47 This left the local seats of power, the
chieftaincies, largely intact.48
Even into the contemporary period, the actual allocation of resources
controlled by the formal state—including the terms and conditions of govern-
ment contracts and concession agreements—resulted from an interplay of
powerful informal networks based largely on political connections and ethnic-
ity reliant on the informal states. There was the semblance of a formal budget-
ary process open to the world; yet every year there were wide variations
between what was budgeted and what was actually allocated. This reflected
the government’s role of securing resources through formal means (aid,
taxes, and foreign investment) to be distributed by informal means (the deci-
sions of networks controlled by traditional authorities), reinforcing regional
and ethnic tensions.
45 Author’s interview with the head of a peacebuilding organization, May 2017.
46 Maponga and Abdullah. (2012); Bah (2011); Acemoglu, Chaves, Osafo-Kwaako, and Robinson
(2016).
47 Brown et al. (2005).
48 Thomson (2007).
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Perversely, the re-introduction of multi-party democracy within the formal
state reinforced this system and exacerbated tensions. Under one-party rule, cor-
ruption in public contracting spread rents across the country. As the political
parties became increasingly regionally—and, thus, ethnically—identified, benefits
once shared across traditional authorities were increasingly limited to those
aligned with the ruling party. When Libya provided tractors to support food secur-
ity policy reform, for example, the equipment was sent to strongholds of the ruling
party in the northern part of Sierra Leone.49 Leaders from the South felt excluded,
with some expressing that, when they came to power, it would be “their turn to
eat.” The national government and its private sector allies, thus, increasingly
became not only a source of tension between the formal and informal states, but
between the informal states themselves.
Mounting social frustration
Leading up to the civil war, the vastmajority of the population had not experienced
the anticipated benefits from the struggle for independence. There was a growing
sense that endemic and, indeed, growing inequality was driven by the rent-seeking
of both elites and bureaucrats at all levels,50 disinterested in any broader exercise
in social or economic development. Violence characterized almost every general
election.
The formal state was largely absent from the daily lives and informal economy
of those living in the former Protectorate; and when it did intervene, the reaction
was hostile. The sentiments behind the numerous strikes, riots, and even revolts of
the Protectorate period became support for, or at least acquiescence in, the five
coup d’états and attempted coups in the post-independence period between
1966 and 1992. The civil war broke out in the isolated border regions with
Liberia, where formal state presence was particularly weak and unwelcome.
The post-conflict period evidenced hopeful developments, including freedom
of the press and greater knowledge of citizens of their rights. Reports by the Auditor
General, the Human Rights Commission, and civil society groups alleging wide-
spread corruption, for example, suggested a more peaceful path for civic frustra-
tions to be expressed. Citizens appeared more willing and more able to demand
accountability from the government.
Yet the impact of civil society activism on conflict and fragility was not unam-
biguous; paradoxically, a free press and greater freedomof association exacerbated
tensions, given a government that did not believe it must be responsive. Citizens
49 Mustapha (2010).
50 Abdullah (2004); Robinson (2008).
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heard that foreign firms were exploiting natural resources without adequate com-
pensation; it was widely reported, for example, that land in Sierra Leone was
valued at only a third of that in Brazil. The lack of medicines in the clinics and
teachers in the classrooms despite the enormous financial flows from abroad
did not go unnoticed, reinforcing well-grounded historical narratives about the
fundamentally corrupt nature of the State. As faster information flows underlined
the absence of transparent and credible corrective measures by government to
address such widely perceived problems, citizens were left feeling cheated.
As a result of these and other factors, socio-political conflict in Sierra Leone
continued to boil over. Sevenmajor strikes and riots in and aroundmining conces-
sions—some resulting in loss of life—took place in the period 2009 to 2014. The
ability of the younger generation to mobilize was particularly evident, as demon-
strated by campus protests that could not be suppressed by government as had
been in the past, as social media allowed the protests to spread from campus to
campus nearly instantaneously. Attempts to suppress student activism through
demonstrations of state force became rampant. Violence, which brought
Freetown to a standstill in February 2018, was again a defining feature of elections.
The reconstruction of the past
Particularly since 2007, those in power have promised that PSD would transform
the lives of citizens. At the state opening of Parliament on 5 October 2007, the
former president, who hailed from the private sector, announced sweeping
reforms:
Introducing financial sector reform to enhance access to capital… Strengthening the Judiciary
to enable quick access to redress… Initiating power sector reform and energy policymanage-
ment … Conducting a close examination with a view to improving transport and communi-
cations in and out of Sierra Leone… Increasing and enhancing skilled labour and improving
labour productivity …
This focus was consistent with the push by a range of bilateral and multilateral
donor agencies and institutions to reform the business environment to develop
the private sector,51 premised, as stated by the World Bank, “on the recognition
that the private sector is central to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs).”52 Implementing this international playbook for pro-private sector reform,
the president intimated, would allow business—and, thus, the country and its
citizens—to prosper.
51 Fisher (2015); Molenaers et al. (2015).
52 IDA (2017).
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This hopeful rhetoric is not so dissimilar from the intent for private sector
expressed at Sierra Leone’s independence. That period saw the continuation of
commodity exporters and trading houses from the colonial period. FDI flowed
into the mining sector. The state supported light manufacturing under an
import substitution strategy, while some indigenous manufacturers and retailers
emerged.
However, neither the Lomé peace agreement, nor post-war government
policy, nor international development aid recognized, or attempted to resolve,
the structural economic contradictions and private sector pathologies that had
doomed these hopeful starts and contributed to the outbreak of violent conflict.
Indeed, there often seemed to be an obstinate insistence to repeat the past. The
IMF andWorld Bank open-market and austeritymeasures that had greatly contrib-
uted to Sierra Leone’s severe lack of distributional justice and extreme poverty in
the pre-war period,53 for example, were largely recycled in the post-conflict period.
These have been found to contribute, inter alia, to the elimination of access to
health care for the most vulnerable through the implementation of user fees sub-
sequent to IMF conditionalities imposed on Sierra Leone.54
This apparent inability to confront the past allowed private sector drivers of
fragility to be re-cemented into the post-war economic order. Business did not
change significantly. Middle class business operators continued to function
through informal channels, creating high-cost products sold only through collu-
sion with public officials. Legitimate bidders lost out because of patronage, exac-
erbating feelings of exclusion. Large enterprises in the natural resources sector,
meanwhile, made illicit payments in increasingly innovative forms, used partly
to cement the positions of recipients who were the custodians of the state’s
resources. Echoes of past entanglements of armed actors with economic interests
were heard in the allegations that government security forces were being used to
suppress citizen protests against mining and plantation company excesses.
This contributed to a context in which the political, economic, and social con-
ditions prevalent in the contemporary period showed increasing similarities with
the past. The effects on the broad majority of the population were apparent in the
dismal and often declining socio-economic indicators of infant and childmortality,
hunger index, rankings in access to education, persistent failure to reachminimum
thresholds for qualification to the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account (MCC), and
poverty levels.55 Widespread under-employment, a sluggish economy, high
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currency’s value against major currencies, and increasing public opposition to
government policy and practice underlined the country’s endemic fragility.
From a linear to a dynamic model of private sector
development and fragility
The above findings contradict the narrative—shared by the Sierra Leone govern-
ment, bilateral donors who are rapidly disengaging, and international institutions
promoting private sector investment as the primary solution to the country’s
underdevelopment—that Sierra Leone has emerged from fragility and, although
set back by the shocks of the global financial crisis and Ebola crisis, is on a path
towards stable development. It further suggests flaws in the thinking—more for-
mally, the theories of change56—driving much of the policy and practice relating
to economic growth and private sector development, particularly as it is advocated
for by role players on the outside looking in to conflict-prone environments like
Sierra Leone. That model can be captured briefly as follows:
The model posits that policy and aid interventions shape economic growth
opportunities and private sector development in ways that ameliorate key
factors of conflict and fragility in a linear fashion.57 This is captured in the short-
hand of the World Bank, as one leading example, as private sector contributions to
“security, justice and jobs.”58 At the economic policy level, austerity measures are
posited to create conditions ofmacro-economic stability in whichmore companies
invest, in turn creating tax revenues that can be spent on public needs to build state
legitimacy. At the level of the business and investment climate, infrastructure
investments are said to break down barriers to private sector opportunity; at the
enterprise level, project finance formining projects, or export-oriented plantations
supposedly create jobs that increase resilience. Such efforts to promote the private
56 Vogel (2012).
57 E.g., DCED (2008).
58 World Bank (2011).
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sector are increasingly key development strategies of FCAS in pursuit of the
Sustainable Development Goals.59
This linear model of the impact of PSD on fragility also underpins prevailing
models underlying FCAS policy, such as the OECD “dimensions of fragility.”60
These tend to measure risks across a variety of dimensions—in the case of the
OECD model, economic, environmental, political, security, and societal—and
then assume that corresponding packages of interventions that address these pre-
senting conditions reduce fragility itself. They take for granted, as asserted the
Freedom of Investment process—an intergovernmental forum on investment
policy hosted since 2006 by the OECD Investment Committee—that “international
investment spurs prosperity and economic development,”61 and thereby contrib-
utes to peace.
Yet this model fails to explain the often poor and even perverse results from
international programming to reduce fragility—as illustrated in the analysis
above for Sierra Leone, where austerity measures became an excuse to remove
political opponents from public service, infrastructure projects were used both
to reward those who vote a certain way and to line the pockets of corrupt officials,
and the increasing dominance of export-oriented agriculture reduced food secur-
ity and local resilience.
These realities do not seem to deter international actors. They continue to
posit private sector promotion as a catalyst of “growth, resilience and opportu-
nity”62 in their FCAS programming, policy advice, and funding, rendering the
private sector “the new donor darling”63 in attempts to address the perceived
root causes of conflict and fragility.
This leaves prevailing approaches to PSD largely detached from any analysis of
Sierra Leone’s political economy, past or present. Policy and practice bypass the
question of how today’s efforts to promote economic growth and private sector
profitability mimic those of the darker, yet not so distant, past; this despite the
role the private sector played in enabling and sustaining the country’s civil war,
as unambiguously set out in the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.64 They fail to address how the private sector impacts, and in turn
is impacted by, the many other factors of fragility that persist in contemporary
Sierra Leone.




63 Kindornay and Reilly-King (2013), 1.
64 TRC (2004).
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It also puts PSD in Sierra Leone and other FCAS strangely at odds with the evi-
dence questioning linkages of private sector promotion efforts to peacebuilding
and statebuilding.65 Policy appears to ignore the increasingly compelling global
evidence that the mere presence of an enabling environment for a profitable
private sector cannot be assumed to be peace positive,66 and that, indeed, in
many cases the presence of operations of business at scale will cause and
exacerbate pre-existing tensions in conflict-prone environments.67
Modelling policy and investment in fragile contexts
The findings laid out above suggests a more robust—yet, in its own way, no more
complex—model of interventions to address conflict and fragility through eco-
nomic growth and private sector promotions strategies in states like Sierra
Leone. This model describes not only what the presenting risks may be, but why
sufficient coalitions for positive change have not been able to coalesce or prevail to
address these social, economic, and political conditions, despite the ostensibly
positive and well-intentioned economic growth and private sector promotion
strategies pursued:
The model draws inspiration from advancements in peacebuilding and state-
building theory. These increasingly question the utility of a package of interven-
tions “aimed at resolving a conflict by addressing its root causes” in favor of
systems perspectives68 that also “ask what factors (actors, issues, motives,
65 E.g., White and Fortune (2015); McIntosh and Buckley (2015).
66 E.g., Ganson (2019); Luiz, Ganson, and Wennmann (2019).
67 E.g., Ganson (2013); Zandvliet and Anderson (2009).
68 De Coning (2016), 1.
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resources, dynamics, attitudes, behaviors) maintain or reinforce the conflict
system, who would resist movement toward peace, and why.”69
The model also intersects with studies showing how “large scale investments
in post-conflict and other fragile environments too often become an additional
source of conflict rather than delivering on the promise of inclusive growth”
through the tendency of fragile political economies to subvert benign interventions
intended to support statebuilding or build resilience.70 It thereby underlines that
the very dynamics of the political order that make a context fragile in the first place
—in particular, state predation for personal greed and to reward support by the
informal states, accompanied by patronage, exclusion, and capacity underutiliza-
tion—also undermine programs meant to address it.71
To take one hypothetical example, all the same rooted in the above analysis,
policy support and project funds may enable the establishment of a palm oil plan-
tation meant to create jobs and tax revenues for public services. But the interme-
diating dynamics of the key factors of conflict and fragility mean that the
negotiation table will include perspectives of the formal but not the informal
states; key concessions and contracts will enrich those in power rather than the
nation as a whole; and state security services may be deployed to displace
people from their traditional lands or stifle their protests.
The private enterprise set in motion by these dynamics, in turn, increases frus-
tration among a well-informed but still relatively powerless civil society, increasing
its sense of grievance, and undermines resilience as the macro-economic context
and business environment increasingly favor large players in the formal economy
that are focused on export of primary commodities over smallholders in the informal
economy who are focused on food for local consumption. The policy intervention
and investment support posited to reduce fragility in fact has the opposite impact.
Analogous real world cases are widespread in the literature.72 The model is,
thus, consistent with, and helps to explain, other analyses that find that growth-ori-
ented strategies in FCAS may “preserve in the end, rather than reform, neopatri-
monialism” and its attendant elite control over resources.73
Additionally, themodel suggests how only those policy and aid interventions, as
well as private sector initiatives that are acceptable to elites—acting as they under-
stand their own interest in light of these key factors of conflict and fragility—have
any hope of achieving meaningful commitment and effective implementation.
69 CDA (2010).
70 Ganson and Wennmann (2017).
71 Ibid. (2016).
72 E.g., Ganson (2013); Zandvliet and Anderson (2009).
73 Englebert and Portelance (2015).
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This helps explain, in the Sierra Leone context, the seemingly endless flow of ideas
and resources to the government for seemingly straight forward reforms—for
example, the Transformation Development Fund that both civil society and the
IMF supported, but all the same could not be advanced in Parliament—that all
the same end up in the policy dustbin or are perverted in their implementation.
The model is, therefore, also consistent with, and helps to explain, studies else-
where that find that “institutions enabling and protecting rents extraction” are
“protected and buttressed” by elites, while “institutions of power and revenue
sharing” are “side-lined and impaired,” leading to “monopolization, elite
predation, and usurpation.”74
Towards more robust metrics for research and policy impact
Acknowledging the ways in which private sector development becomes entangled
with socio-political conflict and other dynamics of fragility should help researchers
and policy makers better model and measure the impact of reforms and initiatives
that shape the private sector. Doing so will help move policy understanding
beyond either the seemingly obsessive focus on growth rates and FDI flows—
which this study shows were drivers of increased rather than decreased conflict
and fragility in Sierra Leone, both before and after the civil war—or even the mea-
surement of progress against “dimensions of fragility,” which appear to be largely
blind to the entanglement of even positively-intended initiatives in the key driving
factors of the political economy of conflict.
A starting point for a more robust set of policy metrics may be found in the
recognition that significant resources injected into a fragile state context will,
absent sufficient, intentional interventions to manage their impacts, have a
strong tendency to exacerbate existing tensions and create new ones—a principle
long established in the humanitarian and development fields75 and in company-
community practice.76 In the context of economic growth policy, investment
climate reform, and PSD, the Sierra Leone and related analyses suggest that
three dynamics appear particularly pronounced:
Power effects
Reform efforts and investments will tend to concentrate power and resources with
the allies of the government in power, both by making more of the economy
74 Amundsen (2014), 169.
75 E.g., Anderson (1999).
76 E.g., Zandvliet and Anderson (2009).
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subject to the controls of macro-economic policy and national institutions (e.g.,
through policies that concentrate and depend on large-scale extractive enter-
prises), and by creating opportunities for those in power to enrich themselves
and their allies. Furthermore, in order to secure control over additional resources,
government attention is focused away from policies more beneficial for inclusive
growth towards those favored by external institutions and investors. The formal
government becomes an even greater arena for conflict, as resentments over
mal-distribution of national resources grows in the face of allocation of state
assets to loyalists and relatives in the form of land, contracts and positions.
Incumbents become desperate to stay in power, both so the “plunder” described
by the TRC (2004) can continue and impunity for past indiscretions can be assured.
Enterprise effects
The private sector enterprises that emerge from these power dynamics are primed
to replicate the extractive practices of the past. Enterprises at any scale are neces-
sarily part and parcel of the closed economic order; they play roles in shaping
decisions—from tax policy to government procurement—to their benefit, not
that of the people as a whole. They rely on the support of state security and
justice institutions to suppress opposition by traditional institutions, communities,
or individuals to their presence and operations. There are few incentives to comply
with environmental or social standards that reduce enterprise profitability for
shareholders and government patrons alike. The prevalence of small players in
global markets facing little reputational risk from questionable behavior, together
with a capital-intensive mining industry that shares rents more with compromised
officials than with the national treasury, yield little to the poorer classes.
Grievance effects
Power and enterprise effects together exacerbate tensions and grievances that are
at the heart of conflict and fragility. The population sees economic policy and infra-
structure development geared towards local elites allied to large enterprises and
their foreign sponsors, while UNDP counts around 80 percent of the population
as poor (2016) of whom the vast majority are within the informal sector. The phe-
nomenon of exclusion is pervasive due to the interplay of the ethnically based
informal states with multi-party democracy, notwithstanding the token non-
ethnic appointments and contracts. The judicial system is considered partisan
and biased towards wealthy elites and their private sector interests. An increasingly
well-informed civil society grows in frustration as it fails to stop any but perhaps the
most egregious cases of abuse across all of the dimensions outlined above.
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These observations are captured below, illustrating for Sierra Leone the nexus
between private sector promotion and development, on the one hand, and key
driving factors of conflict and fragility, on the other:
This suggests that a more robust set of metrics—whether for research, for
policy and institution actors on the international stage, for constructive national
actors, or for an individual enterprise attempting not only to “do no harm” but con-
tribute to peaceful development—may not be so difficult to conceptualize. It
requires only recognition that any intervention become part and parcel of the polit-
ical economy of conflict; and that policy, aid, and PSD interventions will therefore
have an impact, positive or negative, on key driving factors of conflict and fragility.
Furthermore, interventions will be mediated by the dominant dynamics of the
system, shaping the private sector that emerges and its impacts on fragility.
More useful metrics for research and more effective metrics for policy inter-
ventions would track aggregate impacts along dominant vectors of the conflict
system, any of which could be positive or negative:
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Applying such metrics, evaluation of a proposed investment scheme the
power effect of which was to further concentrated power, for example,
would be understood to reinforce fragility. These same metrics would favor
investments that helped to create a more open economic order. In the realm
of enterprise effects, policies could be evaluated for their direct enabling
impact on the informal sector (as done in Ethiopia to lift tens of millions
of smallholder farmers out of poverty77), rather than prioritizing national
tax revenues that bring little local benefit in fragile contexts. Attentiveness
to grievance effects would focus attention on policy coherence and policy
consensus much more inclusive of civil society and opposition voices to
address problems and forge solutions. In other words, modelling and measur-
ing policy initiatives against such metrics help actors to shape power, enter-
prise, and grievance dynamics for positive rather than negative impact on
fragility.
Application of such metrics to research, understand, and evaluate policy
and aid interventions, as well as discrete private sector initiatives, has a
number of implications for research and theory development. First, interna-
tional actors have advocated for some time that private sector actors adopt con-
flict sensitive business practices.78 This analysis supports the notion that such
efforts are critical—and, indeed, much more difficult than typically acknowl-
edged, due to the intermediating effects of key dynamics of conflict and fragility
on any attempts by companies to act in conflict sensitive ways or for outside
actors to influence them.
Second, the analysis underlines that policies and initiatives to promote
economic growth, shape the investment and business climate, and promote PSD
must themselves be conflict sensitive if they are to not reinforce conflict and
fragility rather than promote peaceful development.
Third, all actors must be aware of aggregate impacts on the system. This is
true for individual private sector actors—the positive impact of whose good
practice or program may be overwhelmed by their own negative impacts on
the system elsewhere—and also true for international actors, who must be
attentive, for example, to the regional distribution of private sector projects,
as well as the aggregate attentiveness or inattentiveness to the interests of
domestic actors and the informal sector vis-à-vis those of large and often
foreign enterprises.
77 Luiz, Ganson, and Wennmann (2019).
78 E.g., IFC (2012); OECD (2011).
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Implications for Sierra Leone
The analysis finds that conclusions that Sierra Leone is on a path to greater stability or
inclusive growth79 are overstated, and that the truer story is one of the persistence of
historical dynamics that underpinned fragility. Manipulation of the formal structures
of government for elite predation and a focus on rent-seeking at all levels of the
bureaucracy remain particularly pronounced. Relative calm may prevail because of
popular weariness with conflict. But people feel increasingly insecure as they perceive
both their economic prospects and their traditional institutions to be under attack.80
Conflict risks remain high and may be increasing, with private sector promotion and
development found to be specific vectors alongwhich fragilitymanifests and increases.
In light of these observations, it appears that a model that puts the mediating
effects of the key factors of conflict at the heart of analysis should bring us closer to
the critical questions for inclusive growth and private sector development strate-
gies that more effectively address conflict risk and fragility: What are the power
relationships or institutional arrangements that ameliorate, rather than reinforce,
fragility? Given that no society chooses poverty or insecurity, what has inhibited a
sufficient coalition for change from forming? In what domains might it be possible
for one to emerge? And what kinds of international interventions—particularly in
the realm of PSD—might help them do so?
Such questions will necessarily move analysis away from a focus on presenting
conditions in which it is assumed that conflict risk and fragility are reduced if an
enterprise that nudges the youth unemployment rate lower is created, or if better
legislation is introduced in the extractives sector. They will usefully move analysis
towards assessment of what we might call the political economy of fragility: socio-
political dynamics inhibiting the mobilization of coalitions sufficient to confront
and change power relationships and institutional arrangements that exacerbate
problems rather than provide solutions. As international and domestic actors
design and implement policies and programs for inclusive growth and greater eco-
nomic opportunity, including private sector promotion, theymove from a focus on
what is not there—for example, jobs or public services—to understanding what is
there—powerful dynamics inhibiting positive change.
The model developed above demonstrates that these dynamics are not neces-
sarily difficult to understand. To the extent it helps to explain the persistence of
fragility in Sierra Leone, there are warnings for those attempting to use private
sector development to deliver peaceful and inclusive development in fragile and
79 E.g., IMF (2016).
80 Fanthorpe (2005).
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conflict-affected contexts. As a regional divide becomes increasingly evident along
ethnic lines in Sierra Leone, these findings take on urgency. They can be
summarized as follows, in some cases refining and in others challenging prevailing
policies towards PSD, conflict, and fragility in Sierra Leone:
Policy premised on a “return to normalcy” or “return to peace” by “rebuilding”
the country rests on unstable conceptual and factual foundations. Neither the Lomé
peace agreement nor subsequent political developments established a new social
contract. Rather, they provided avenues for the root causes of conflict in Sierra
Leone to continue into the present period.81 Since the fundamental trajectory of
conflict related to private sector development has not been altered,82 current
levels of conflict may not be indicative of actual conflict risk.
Capital intensive growth yields returns to few within the country. High growth
in Sierra Leone has only been achieved through the export ofminerals, as well as by
shifts towards plantation agriculture and cash crops. Whether through symptoms
of the Dutch Disease, increased land conflict, or otherwise, these developments
have tended to increase inequality, decrease resilience, and expose more people
to greater economic insecurity.
Traditional institutions of the informal states, as well as the human security and
social stability they have historically provided, are undermined by rapid, poorly
managed growth. They become less able, for example, to deliver conflict resolution
or justice. Generous (even if unsustainable) assistance by international aid organi-
zations, further reduces their legitimacy.83
“Statebuilding” initiatives may have perverse impacts. There are currently no
mechanisms or structures through which Sierra Leone’s many, largely informal,
power centers can reach durable understandings on the proper distribution of
the costs, risks, and benefits of private sector development. Thus, attempts to
increase the ability of the formal state at a national level to control and allocate
resourcesmostly increase its prominence as a target for inter-group contestation.84
Accelerated economic growth without commensurate management of inter-
group dynamics—whether inter-ethnic or rural-urban—will predictably exacerbate
fragility and enable conflict. Elites—in both the political class and the bureaucratic
class—within a limited economy exercise inordinate control over the formal
81 Keen (2005).
82 Jackson (2005); See also Miller, Ganson, Cechvala, and Miklian (2019) on interactions of PSD
with key drivers of fragility.
83 Fanthorpe (2003); see also Luiz (2016) on the ways in which institutions adapt (or fail to adapt)
influences transitions from fragility.
84 See, e.g., Ganson and Wennmann (2017) on the tendency of reform efforts to reinforce eco-
nomic conflicts.
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economy. The distribution of benefits and risks from economic growth remain
skewed and highly contested; additional resources, particularly at scale, mean
additional fuel on the fire.85
Conclusions and future research directions
If Sierra Leone is to move away from fragility, national as well as international
actors must face the past and see its shadow on the present. Yet former
President Koroma at the closing of Parliament in December 2017 laid claim to a
highly successful ten-year stint, notwithstanding data showing declining condi-
tions for the bulk of the population;86 successive IMF reports still continue to
praise the government. Critical voices are rarely acknowledged by policy actors,
despite currency devaluations, high interest rates, rising public debt, and the
evident weaknesses of the real economy.
The private sector is typically defined as that part of the economy that is not
controlled by government. Under this classical formulation, Sierra Leone has little
private sector at scale. Any true private sector is constrained by a limited economic
order in which rent-seeking behavior dominates all major sectors of the formal
economy, including mining, commercial agriculture, infrastructure development,
and industry. Major private sector actors appear to be willing partners in economic
policies and business practices that reflect aligned elite and foreign interests,
rather than sustainable, inclusive, and peaceful development path for the
country as a whole.
These dynamics render Sierra Leone vulnerable to the historical dynamics
underpinning state failure and civil war. The informal states compete for power
over—rather than seeking to strengthen or build the legitimacy of—national insti-
tutions. Public distrust driven by a variety of forms of corruption, government
unwillingness or inability to enforce regulations, and a general indifference to
public imperatives undermine state capacity to address shocks like the Ebola
crisis. Security forces and the justice system are abused for private ends, escalating
the state-society crisis and rendering individual security impossible. Recent
community protests, student manifestations, and election violence—unfolding
in a context in which localized riots and strikes historically preceded national
conflict—demonstrate how easily chronic popular dissatisfactionwith government
can result in conflict and violence.
85 See, e.g., Stewart (2002) on the impact of horizontal inequalities on conflict and development.
86 UNDP (2017).
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Building on analysis of historical and contemporary dynamics, themodel con-
structed aspires to make these connections between private sector development
and Sierra Leone’s sustained fragility more explicit and more testable. The
model also asserts, however, that they need not remain true. It suggests paths by
which private sector policy and investment might contribute to consequential
changes in the country’s power structures and institutional arrangements—
notwithstanding their apparent resilience in the face of crisis and violent
conflicts—by applying the lenses of power effects, enterprise effects, and grievance
effects within a dynamic systems understanding to promote a positively—rather
than negatively—reinforcing political economy.
Built inductively from practical insight into the role of the private sector in
Sierra Leone, the model also guides further inquiry. It posits explanatory vari-
ables—in particular, the intermediating variables of power, enterprise, and conflict
effects—as entry points for research into the effectiveness of private sector promo-
tion and investment policies in fragile contexts with empirical and theoretical ref-
erents. As such, themodel serves as a constructed type, selecting and accentuating
distinctive aspects of the negative (and potentially positive) interactions of private
sector policy, investment, and business operations with key drivers of conflict and
fragility, allowing future case studies to be described in comparable terms.87
The model also posits causal relationships that guide exploration of outcomes
and their association with different variables, building toward a more robust
explanatory typology.88 It is, thus, a modest step towards an empirically rigorous
and theoretically sound description of the policies and practices that might make
more real the promises—so far unfulfilled—of private sector development in
service of inclusive growth, resilience, and peaceful development in fragile contexts.
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